The Foreign Equities Division laid out the important factors to help effectively regulate systemic risk. The factors that lead to effective systemic risk regulation include the creation of a comprehensible legislative workflow to strengthen regulatory enforcement activities; preparation of risk evaluation and probable risk cautionary measures built on all-encompassing assessment; supporting risk cautionary measures with straightforward information about financial instruments and entities; and the translation of risk cautionary measures and relevant policy sanctions made by the systemic risk regulation into tangible cases by the Foreign Equities Division.
Such proposed enhancement has been correlated to a physician examining a patient, making a diagnosis and prescribing medicine. The patient then decides whether to abide by the physician’s prescription. The physician is not in the critical spot to take direct action, with which the medication and therapy will only be as good as the patient’s motivation to take the medicine as recommended.
The Foreign Equities Division outlined a practicable meaning of systemic risk as the probability that an occurrence will set off a loss of economic worth or certainty in a considerable portion of the market system that is grave enough to have major unfavorable effects on the economy as is.
Risk exposure and discovery carried out by the Foreign Equities Division requires tracking risk to determine the origin of risks from within the market system, curtailed from financial entities, or industry structure. Risk tracking requires handling sizeable and usually incongruent amounts of information. Also, constant market aptitude progress is vital for efficient risk tracking and the immediate discovery of new financial instruments, practices or enterprise operational strategies which could produce risks in various markets.
As for the Foreign Equities Division, market knowledge will be supplemented by industry-specific and policy awareness accessible to allied agencies represented. Risk tracking should be conducted by tools, including simultaneous financial immovability signals and forward-looking early cautionary measures and paradigms. These helpful tools have to be consistently efficient so as to catch advancements in market activities, influenced by new products and new operational paradigms.
It is noted that certain financial indicators encompass an immense line up of signals, including asset valuations, risk inclinations, market liquidity, funding liquidity, and credit risk. Some of these signals may include details significant to early cautionary measures as they may attract interest to swiftly growing disclosure to specific asset classes and broad-based growth in financial leverage.
Risk evaluation associates to the appraisal of the significance and probable rigorousness of each risk determined as pertinent in the inspection phase. It should therefore comprise of a statistical assessment of the probability that the possible risk conditions will occur. It should also comprise of cost approximation in terms of the breakdown of institutions, costs drawn from the faulty of financial markets or downturn of the actual economy.
The result of these elements develops the foundation for the positioning of risks. Statistical methods and analytical tools such as stress testing models should aid, along with expert reasoning, the placement or positioning of risks.
Stress testing paradigms have become the usual reference for macro-prudential stability assessment for the longest time ever, including numerical impact evaluation for particular conditions. Their chief principle is to evaluate the flexibility of the financial systems against intense but still conceivable events.
The risk evaluation undertaking is presently much less improved than the risk discovery one. This is not only due to it requiring substantial analytical complexity, but also because there are sizeable gaps in the information on hedge funds and other financial intermediaries and their connections with other parts of the market system.
Systemic risk assessment requires support by a range of sophisticated evaluation paradigms and tools, and an abstract workflow for using them. The multifaceted and interconnected financial network requires a consistent multiple testing of several signals or procedures. Also, the speed of modernization necessitates that the array of tools for systemic risk discovery and evaluation be regularly enhanced.
While the risk evaluation activities relatively become progressively more mathematical, it must never become automatic or completely paradigm-based. Expert ruling and variable testing’s will always be critical to clarify the information coming from various statistical tools.
A thorough knowledge base is also valuable in the risk discovery activity that paves the way the actual risk evaluation. This is due to the establishment of an extensive radar screen supporting meticulous tracking is only practicable if the significant information is readily accessible.
The present economic downturn revealed that an important element of credit intermediation was course through externally the regulated financial sector and off the monitoring screen into hedge funds and other entities composing the non-regulated financial market system. Furthermore, not much was uncovered about the linkages between this financial market system and the regulated sector, which turned out to be sizeable.
Information on other non-financial institutions, possibly of systemic relevance, such as hedge funds, was spread, not value-checked and supplied on a deliberate basis. An inclination to produce a bias towards the best productivity was the outcome.
Supplementing risk discovery and evaluation, the systemic risk assessor will also hand out risk cautionary measures and policy proposals. This is new and will vary significantly from other types of examination. The Foreign Equities Division must interpret systemic risk evaluations into proposals for material policy actions.
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